

market economy of the United States. Röpke's main point is that centrist thinking leads to tyranny, violence, and destruction, all of which are marks of a totalitarian state. The real threat to free-market ideals always comes from centralized domestic sources.

Röpke's main thesis is that certain ideals are upheld in a free-market economy which arise out of individual interests fostered in a communal atmosphere. These same ideals cement society and fertilize the moral sensibilities of man. Whereas many modern thinkers believe that true "progress" is guaranteed through the dissolution of tradition and morality, Röpke suggests that it is precisely through the recovery of such fundamental truths as faith and family whereby man's freedom will be nurtured and human dignity will be preserved.

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Roger Scruton, *The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat*. Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books, 2002. Cloth, 187 pp., \$19.95.

Roger Scruton is an English philosophy professor and prolific writer, widely hailed as a "conservative." In his recent book, *The West and the Rest*, he attempts to distinguish Western civilization from other civilizations, particularly from Islamic civilization, and to present a defense of what he sees as the West's virtues. Scruton, however, defends a conception of the West based solely on the Enlightenment, one in which religion has retreated from public life and in which nations are held together chiefly by an abstract sense of citizenship and civic duties. "Western civilization is composed of communities held together by a political process, and by the rights and duties of the citizen as defined by that process" (16). Christianity, in Scruton's mind, is valuable on

the one hand because, unlike Islam, it allowed for the creation of a state based on secular law, and on the other, because it helps create a kind of *gemeinschaft* or pre-political kinship, upon which the secular state depends for its stability and continuance. For although the author continually extols the virtues of "citizenship," he realizes that the Enlightenment concept of the citizen, bound to his fellows merely by legal prescriptions and civic feeling, hardly satisfies the human desire for warmth and fellowship. It is too thin and cold an ideal. Thus the need for local, family and religious loyalties. Scruton, indeed, admits that the decline of religion in the modern West endangers his notion of a secular Enlightenment polity. "When religious faith evaporates . . . then inevitably the society of strangers, held together by citizenship, is under threat" (82). But for a Catholic such a conception of religion is not acceptable, for a purely privatized religion is really no religion at all. It is one thing to realize the necessity of making certain concessions because we live in a pluralist society; it is another thing entirely to consciously limit religion to the private sphere. The modern West has indeed largely done this, but we do not need to accept this privatization of religion as somehow constitutive of Western culture.

Scruton's brief account of Western intellectual history presents the development of European thought as the gradual triumph of secularism, culminating in the social contract theory of the state and Enlightenment privatization of religion. He confuses the medieval *distinction* between Church and state (the "two swords") with the *separation* of Church and state, a notion which the Catholic Church has condemned numerous times. His heroes are Hobbes, Marsilius of Padua (an anti-papal writer of the late Middle Ages), and other social contract theorists. About Marsilius he says that he expressed "what was to become the accepted Western view of the matter in his *Defensor Pacis*. According to Marsilius it is the state and not the church that guarantees

the civil peace, and reason, not revelation, to which appeal must be made in all matters of temporal jurisdiction" (4-5). "The separation of church and state was from the beginning an accepted doctrine of the church" (5). Indeed, Scruton hardly seems aware of the Catholic tradition of political thought, restated with great clarity in the nineteenth century by Pius IX and Leo XIII. Although the Enlightenment view of the matter is certainly commonly accepted today, it seems odd to write as if it had never been challenged and simply reigned undisturbed in the Western intellectual tradition.

With such an idea of Western life and thought, Scruton necessarily overstates the contrasts with Islam. Leaving aside the obvious theological differences, Islam also has different notions of the relations of religion and politics. Whereas the Catholic Church has always accepted the distinction between Church and state, while opposing a separation between these two powers, Islam has tended to confuse or blur any distinction between religion and state. Scruton makes much of the resulting fact that modern Islamic modes of political loyalty are based not on an impersonal notion of citizenship, but on religious or tribal bonds. Nevertheless, many of the things that he says about Moslem indignation toward Western secularism would be shared by any serious Christian with a sense of tradition. For instance, Scruton himself bemoans the ugly architectural monstrosities foisted upon the Islamic world—as when Le Corbusier managed to persuade the French government to allow him to level the old city of Algiers and replace it with his modernist concoctions—calling them "insolent" and "repulsive." The differences between Islam and the West cannot be reduced to faith versus secularism, unless one is willing to relegate Western religion—that is, Christianity—to merely an adjunct to secular society.

Scruton in a sense wants to have his cake and eat it too. He wants religion to remain a real social force, but one that has little or no influence in public life. He clearly is not willing for Europe and her daughter cultures to return to their religious roots, and can be quite caustic about religious truth claims, as in his praise of Lessing's 1779 drama *Nathan the Wise*, a work written in support of religious indifferentism, or his statement that "the Enlightenment displaced theology from the heart of the curriculum in order to put the disinterested pursuit of truth in its place" (80). He is equally critical of post-modernist, nihilist thinkers, without realizing that such philosophies flow directly from his beloved Enlightenment, for most of our current intellectual absurdities can be traced clearly back through Hegel to Kant. The Enlightenment conception of reason fails because it does not allow reason to consider the possibility of Revelation. There is nothing contrary to reason in considering the possibility that God may have entered into human history and spoken to man, but for the sons of the Enlightenment, including Scruton, this is not an admissible hypothesis.

When Scruton turns from discussing what he thinks is the essence of the West to describing Islam, about which he knows a good deal, his book becomes both more interesting and more helpful. In one of the most fascinating parts, Scruton traces the history of modern Islamic movements, beginning with the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1940s, movements which ultimately evolved into today's terrorist groups. Most of these groups arose because of Western occupation of Moslem lands or because Moslems, unwisely permitted to settle in Europe, conceived anger and rage at what they saw as blasphemy and immorality among Westerners.

These observations lead directly to the specific policy prescriptions which Scruton makes in his Conclusion. Despite what I have said in criticism of this book, I think that these policy prescriptions are worthy of consideration. Basically they

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come down to trying to separate the two worlds, Western and Moslem, based on a feeling that if the Moslems were left alone more they would not trouble the West. So he recommends less dependence on imported oil, a de-emphasis on free trade and the organizations that foster it, such as the World Trade Organization, and at the same time a limitation on Islamic immigration into the West. And he calls upon Westerners to realize that we cannot necessarily be free to travel anywhere in the world that we desire, flaunting our mores as we do so and ignoring the affront we give to others.

Although Scruton's concept of Western culture can hardly recommend itself to a Catholic, we might well learn from him how not to foster Islamic terrorism. Perhaps, then, if we do not return the West to its real roots, at least we will not encourage conduct which can only harm ourselves and the rest of the human race as well.

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Philip Jenkins, *The Next Christendom*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Paper, 288 pp., \$14.95

Philip Jenkins' book has had the fortunate effect of reintroducing the term "Christendom" into scholarly debate. The "Next Christendom" which he describes differs greatly from the first. Using statistical and sociological analysis, he examines the dynamics of Christianity and Christian life in the twenty-first century. Jenkins' picture of Christianity will surprise many readers.

This book's central point is to awaken the modern western Christian to the realities of the future. Jenkins primarily does this in three ways. First he aims to de-center Christianity from the Euro-American landscape. This is not as insidious as it sounds. As a sociologist, he is merely pointing out an accomplished fact. Christianity has left Europe